Al-Muqawama al-Islamiya fi Bilad al-Haramain, also known as the Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Mosques, or MIBH is a new front group that has claimed responsibility for drone attacks against Israel in recent weeks. Given that Saudi Arabia is home to two of the holiest mosques in Islam, al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca and al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina, and is frequently referred to as the “Land of the Two Holy Mosques” or similar variations, the group’s name appears to be meant to imply an affiliation with pro-Iranian militants from that country. “With pride and honor, the Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Mosques announces the launch of its first jihadist operation, targeting a vital site in occupied Palestine…via drone,” MIBH said in a statement claiming responsibility for the October 25 strike, which was launched from Saudi territory. The Islamic Resistance from the Land of the Two Mosques is conducting this operation as a demonstration of the Arabian Peninsula’s people’s active desire to oppose Israel.
Iraq’s role in anti-Israel attacks
Three brief films of these alleged attacks—two taken during the day and one at night have been released by the group. The majority of the visuals in these films are obscured to avoid geolocation, as is customary. However, the visible topography seems to be different from the areas that are usually included in drone launch films released by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), which are most likely shot in Syria. The beautiful dune desert that appears to have been designed to resemble northern Saudi Arabia in the MIBH footage suggests that these individuals may have either crossed the border to start attacks from Saudi territory or sought to create that appearance. All the evidence points to MIBH being a front organization created by the Iraqi muqawama (resistance), despite its name. The manner of the movies demonstrating the alleged attacks further suggests that this is a front for the muqawama, as does the language employed in the group’s declarations, which closely resembles that of the IRI.
Unraveling the Saudi connection to Iraq-based militants
Any Saudi nationals participating in these attacks are most likely being directed by Iraqi militants, notwithstanding reports that Iraqi militias have a small number of Saudi and other Gulf Arab guest fighters and training. The incident is similar to the April 27 drone strike on Israel that was allegedly carried out by the Bahraini organization Saraya al-Ashtar and was most likely planned by Iraq. An apparent Saudi “wing” of IRI has emerged, which brings to mind Kataib Hezbollah’s (KH) January declarations promising backing for further operations in Saudi Arabia. “We also have the resistance in Bahrain and Hejaz [Saudi Arabia],” stated Jafar al-Husseini, the KH military spokesman, on January 9. Although their presence is unclear at the moment, it will become more apparent in the upcoming years and conflicts. KH continues to be Iran’s principal southward-facing proxy in Iraq, carrying out activities against the Gulf states through its front organization Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq.
New threats emerge against Israel
The recent increase in Houthi hostility toward Saudi oppositionists in Sanaa, Yemen, is also noteworthy. The Iran-backed militia has also trained members of the kingdom’s Shia minority, especially from Qatif, and welcomed Saudi Ismailis from Najran, a Saudi province that the Houthis view as captured Yemeni land. The Houthis declared on October 31 that a “military council” of Saudi oppositionists would be meeting in Sanaa. Additionally, Houthi-controlled Saba TV featured oppositionist pieces earlier this month. The Houthis’ long-standing goal of establishing themselves as a revolutionary frontrunner among Iran’s “axis of resistance” factions, including those on the Arabian Peninsula, is reflected in these actions. Such attempts point to the increasing encirclement of Saudi Arabia by Iranian partner forces, especially when coupled with KH and Houthi cooperative operations against Israel, as demonstrated by the June 30 killing of a top Houthi drone specialist at a KH location in Jurf al-Sakhar.
Regional alliances and the shadow of proxy warfare
The Counter ISIS Finance Group, a larger alliance founded in 2015 to prevent ISIS financing, is co-chaired by Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Italy. A financial intelligence unit (FIU) affiliated with the Egmont Group was established in Saudi Arabia. 31 Memorandums of Understanding for the sharing of information in this area have been signed by the FIU and its counterparts. Along with taking part in the Egmont Group’s events, it has also given the organization $1 million.